Florida Law Review
Volume 24

Issue 4

Article 12

June 1972

Florida Constitutional Law: A New Inherent Right to Devise?
George W. Estess

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr
Part of the Law Commons

Recommended Citation
George W. Estess, Florida Constitutional Law: A New Inherent Right to Devise?, 24 Fla. L. Rev. 801 (1972).
Available at: https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol24/iss4/12

This Case Comment is brought to you for free and open access by UF Law Scholarship Repository. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Florida Law Review by an authorized editor of UF Law Scholarship Repository. For more
information, please contact kaleita@law.ufl.edu.

1972]

Estess: Florida Constitutional Law: A New Inherent Right to Devise?
CASE COMMENTS

This holding, in concert with the concept of a civil action for damages,
has enormous implications in the field of environmental protection. If a
developer knows he will bear the expense of restoring the area desecrated
by his illegal activities, either by mandatory injunction or suit for damages,
he may be more likely to observe statutory procedures. In cases where this
prospect does not deter the developer, a suit for damages appears to be the
more adequate remedy. This would provide competent restoration immediately as opposed to the slower injunctive process evidenced in the
instant case.64
The instant decision indicates that violators of dredge and fill permit
procedures are no longer risking only a token fine or an order to cease
and desist. Even if restoration will not return shorelands to their natural
state, the deterrent effect of the new remedy will provide greater environmental protection than current criminal sanctions.
ROD BROCK

FLORIDA CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: A NEW INHERENT
RIGHT TO DEVISE?
In re Estate of McGinty, 258 So. 2d 450 (Fla. 1971)
Appellant, daughter of a deceased homestead property owner, was to
receive decedent's residence under his will. The trial court held the devise
invalid under Florida Statutes, section 731.05 (1), which prohibits devise of
homestead property if the owner is survived by lineal descendants.' The
court found the statute not to be in conflict with the 1968 Florida constitution, article X, section 4 (c), which prohibits devise of homestead if the
owner is survived by minor children. 2 The Florida supreme court reversed
and HELD, the statutory prohibition was inconsistent with the constitutional
prohibition and therefore unconstitutional.3
64. See note 54 supra.
1. FLA. STAT. §731.05 (1969) provides: "Any property, real or personal, held by any
title, legal or equitable, with or without actual seisin, may be devised or bequeathed by
will; provided, however, that whenever a person who is head of a family, residing in this
state and having a homestead therein, dies and leaves either a widow or lineal descendants
or both surviving him, the homestead shall not be the subject of devise, but shall descend
as otherwise provided in this law for the descent of homesteads." (Emphasis added.)
2. FLA. CoNsr. art. X, §4(c) provides in part: "The homestead shall not be subject
to devise if the owner is survived by spouse or minor child." (Emphasis added.)
3. 258 So. 2d at 451.
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Restraints on the devise of homestead property4 have operated historically
as a corollary to the homestead exemption from forced sale. This exemption,
first adopted by the 1868 Florida constitution," was designed to protect the
family from financial adversity by freeing the homestead from forced sale
by creditors., Although the 1868 constitution did not prohibit testamentary
disposition of homestead property, Florida courts subsequently afforded
7
the family this additional security by exempting the homestead from devise
and requiring its descent to the heirs of the owner, subject to the widow's
dower right.8
In accord with this judicial mandate, the 1885 constitution impliedly
prohibited devise of the homestead where the holder was survived by "children."9 Thereafter, the legislature enacted the predecessor 0 of Florida
Statutes, section 731.05 (1),11 which expanded the constitutional prohibition"
by expressly disallowing devise if the owner were survived by a widow. In
4. See FLA. COxST. art. X, 64 (a) (1). For an analysis of the changing nature of homestead
property see Weiss v. Stone, 220 So. 2d 403 (3d D.C.A. Fla. 1969); White v. Posick, 150
So. 2d 263 (2d D.C.A. Fla. 1963). See also I D. REDFEARN, WILLS AND ADMINISTRATION OF
ESTATs IN FLORIDA 448-51 (4th ed. 1971); Crosby & Miller, Our Legal Chameleon, The
Florida Homestead Exemption, 2 U. FLA. L. REX. 11, 29-31, 37-52 (1949).
5. FLA. CONST. art. IX, §3 (1868). For an historical development of Florida homestead
law prior to its adoption by the constitution see Shapo, Restraints on Alienation and
Devise of Homestead: Monsters Unfettered from Florida's Past, 19 U. MIAmI L. REv. 72,
81-84 (1964).
6. See, e.g., In re Noble's Estate, 73 So. 2d 873, 874 (Fla. 1954); Collins v. Collins, 150
Fla. 374, 377, 8 So. 21 443, 444 (1942); In re Van Meter's Estate, 214 So. 2d 639, 642 (2d
D.C.A. Fla. 1968).
7. Wilson v. Fridenburg, 19 Fla. 461, 469 (1882). This prohibition was grounded upon
the language of article IX of the 1868 constitution, which provided that the homestead
"shall not be alienable without the joint consent of husband and wife when that relation
exists." The court found this provision operated to prevent testamentary as well as inter
vivos disposition. The court, however, justified this restriction of devise by its conclusion
that the authorities in point prohibited the husband from devising the homestead. Id. at
469-70. See also Brokaw v. McDougall, 20 Fla. 212 (1883).
8. Brokaw v. McDougall, 20 Fla. 212, 226 (1883).
9. FLA. CONsT. art. X, §4 (1885) provided: "Nothing in this Article shall be construed
to prevent the holder of a homestead from alienating his or her homestead so exempted
by deed or mortgage duly executed by himself or herself, and by husband and wife, if
such relation exists; nor if the holder be without children to prevent him or her from
disposing of his or her homestead by will in a manner prescribed by law." (Emphasis
added.)
10. Fla. Laws 1899, ch. 4730, at 119-20 provided: "Whenever a person who is the
head of a family residing in this state and having his homestead herein, shall die and
leave a widow surviving him, but no children, the homestead shall descend to the widow
"
and shall not be the subject of devise by last will and testament ....
11. Fla. Laws 1899, ch. 4730 dealt with the "descent of homesteads" whereas FLA. STAT.
§731.05 (1969) deals with "property which may be devised." However, the prohibition
against devise of the homestead was contained in the descent statute until 1933 when it
was placed in §731.05. See Fla. Laws 1933, ch. 16103, §6, at 545-46.
12. Although the 1885 constitution implied a restriction on devise only when the
owner was survived by "children," the courts interpreted the provision as an absolute
prohibition. See Caro v. Caro, 45 Fla. 203, 207, 34 So. 309, 310 (1903); De Cottes v.
Clarkson, 43 Fla. 1, 10, 29 So. 442, 444 (1901).
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,Thomas v. Williamson:3 the Florida supreme court upheld this enactment
on the ground that the state constitution was a limitation on power, not a
grant of power.1 4 Since the 1885 constitution neither prohibited nor permitted the devise of the homestead where the owner was without children,
the legislature was free to impose the additional prohibition against devise
if the owner were survived by a widow.' 5
The statute's wording remained unchanged", until enactment of the
Florida Probate Code1 7 in 1983. Section 731.05(l) of the code incorporated
the former constitutional and statutory restraints by restricting devise if
the homestead owner was survived by "widow or lineal descendants or
both." 8 Although the term "lineal descendants" further restricted devise,
the statute was again held to be constitutional. 19
Constitutional and statutory restraints against the devise of homestead
property have often been misapplied.20 Even when correctly applied, the
results have often been inequitable and contrary to the concept of homestead
law.21 Unjust results originally stemmed from the courts' distorted interpretation of the term "children." 22 Two early cases 23 held that a mother could
not devise her homestead to her adult daughters who remained at home to
care for her, since such a devise would exclude other surviving children24
In sustaining this position the court rejected the contention that "children"
meant "minor children."2 5 Although this statutory language may have been
13. 51 Fla. 332, 40 So. 831 (1906). See also Jackson v. Jackson, 90 Fla. 563, 107 So. 244
(1925); Saxon v. Rawls, 51 Fla. 555, 41 So. 594 (1906).
14. 51 Fla. at 341, 40 So. at 833. This doctrine of constitutional interpretation is still
in force. See, e.g., Monington v. Turner, 251 So. 2d 872 (Fla. 1971); State ex rel. Jones
v. Wiseheart, 245 So. 2d 849 (Fla. 1971).
15. 51 Fla. at 341-42, 40 So. at 833-34.
16. The statute was contained in the following provisions: Fla. Laws 1899, ch. 4730;
Fla. Stat. §2297 (1906); Fla. Stat. §3620 (1920); Fla. Comp. Gen. Laws §5484 (1927).
17. FLA. STAT. chs. 731-34 (1969). See Fla. Laws 1933, ch. 16103, §6, at 545-46.
18. FLA. STAT. §731.05 (1) (1969). For exact statutory language, see note 1 supra.
19. The constitutionality of the statute was upheld in a case in which the Florida
supreme court denied a challenge that .claimed the children had vested remainders under
the constitution. Nesmith v. Nesmith, 155 Fla. 823, 21 So. 2d 789 (1945).
20. The courts have historically confused article X, §2 of the 1885 constitution, which
provided that the exemption "inure to the widow and heirs" upon the death of the
homestead owner, and article X, §4, which restricted devise. See, e.g., Shone v. Bellmore, 75
Fla. 515, 78 So. 605 (1918); Palmer v. Palmer, 47 Fla. 200, 35 So. 983 (1904); Marsh v.
Hartley, 109 So. 2d 34, 37 (2d D.C.A. Fla. 1959). For an extensive discussion of this confusion see Crosby & Miller, supra note 4; Shapo, supra note 5.
21. The purpose of homestead law, as stated earlier in this comment, is to provide
protection for the family. See text accompanying note 6 supra. Prohibiting the devise of
the homestead where only adult lineal descendants survive and requiring them to share
in its descent does not seem to be in consonance with this concept.
22. FLA. CONST. art. X, §4 (1885) ("nor if the holder be without children'). (Emphasis
added.)
23. Caro v. Caro, 45 Fla. 203, 34 So. 309 (1903); De Cottes v. Clarkson, 43 Fla. 1, 29 So.
442 (1901).
24. Caro v. Caro, 45 Fla. 203, 207, 34 So. 309, 310 (1903); De Cottes v. Clarkson, 43
Fla. 2, 8-10, 29 So. 442, 444 (1901).
25. De Cottes v. Clarkson, 43 Fla. 1, 10, 29 So. 442, 444 (1901).
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correctly interpreted, it fostered a situation in which adult children who
still resided with the family were required to share with those who no longer
lived at home. Under Florida Statutes, section 731.05 (1), the courts continued to enforce these harsh restrictions. In Moorefield v. Byrne 26 the court
applied this section to nullify a deceased father's will conveying the homestead to his second wife. The court ruled in favor of the decedent's adult
children by a prior marriage because the children were "lineal descendants
27
in being at the time of the death of the decedent.The Florida Constitutional Revision Commission attempted to remedy
this situation8 by proposing the 1968 constitution, article X, section 4 (c),
which in contrast to the 1885 constitution 2 9 restricts devise of homestead
only where the owner is survived by "spouse or minor child." 30
If the meaning of a constitutional provision is not discernible on its face,
courts may look behind the constitution to ascertain the intent of the
framers.31 The records of the Hearings of the Constitutional Revision
Commission indicate that the drafters of the 1968 constitution intended to
permit devise of homestead in all cases except when the owner 32 is survived
by spouse or minor children. 33 Therefore, the court in the instant case
could have found an implied prohibition against any further legislative
restriction. If the 1968 constitution's article X, section 4 (c) is read as such
a prohibition, the statutory class of "lineal descendants" is unconstitutionally restrictive.
While the instant court may have given effect to the drafters' intent,
its decision was not based upon that ground. Instead, the court found that,
since the class of persons legislatively designated as "lineal descendants" was
inconsistent with the class of persons designated as "minor children," the
constitutional classification controlled. 4 Moreover, the court stated: "The
restraint on the right of an individual to devise his property at death should

26. 140 So. 2d 876 (3d D.C.A. Fla. 1962).
27. Id. at 877 (quoting from FLA. STAT. §731.27) (1969).
28. 68 FLORIDA CONSTITUTIONAL REVISION COMa'N, HEARINGS 258-92 (1966). The record
reveals that a major reason for amending the 1885 constitution, art. X, §4, was to permit
homestead owners to devise if only adult children survive. Id.
29. FLA. CONST. art. X, §4 (1885). See note 9 supra for the text of this provision.
30. FLA. CONsT. art. X, §4 (c). See note 2 supra for the text of this provision.
31. See Hayek v. Lee County, 231 So. 2d 214 (Fla. 1970); Gray v. Bryant, 125 So. 2d 846,
852 (Fla. 1960).
32. FLA. CONT. art. X, §1 (a) uses the term "head of the family" in creating the homestead exemption whereas article X, §4(c) uses the term "owner" in restricting devise.
However, the owner must also be the head of the family. See, e.g., Vandiver v. Vincent,
139 So. 2d 704 (2d D.C.A. Fla. 1962); Abernathy v. Gruppo, 119 So. 2d 398 (3d D.C.A.
Fla. 1960). For a discussion of the requirements and relationships necessary for an owner
to qualify as head of the family see 1 D. REDFEARN, supra note 4, at 444-48; Comment,
Homestead: Family Headship, 7 U. FLA. L. REV. 102 (1954). See also In re Wilder's Estate,
240 So. 2d 514 (1st D.C.A. Fla. 1970); In re Van Meter's Estate, 214 So. 2d 639 (2d D.C.A.
Fla. 1968).
33. 68 FLORIDA CONSTITUTIONAL REVISION COMM'N, HEARINGS 258-92 (1966).
34. 258 So. 2d at 451.
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not be extended beyond that expressly allowed by the Constitution." 35 This
statement implies that the constitution is a grant of power or that the right
to devise property is thus inherent in ownership. Neither proposition, however, is supportable. The right to devise property is not an inherent right, 36
but rather is subject to legislative discretion.37 Because the state constitution
is dearly a limitation on power rather than a grant of power,38 this legislative discretion may be restricted only by express or implied prohibitions
in the constitution. The term "lineal descendants" is not inconsistent per se
with the term "minor child," since the class of persons designated as "lineal
descendants" includes minor children and therefore satisfies the constitution's
express prohibition that the homestead shall be subject to devise if minor
children survive. As noted in Justice Adins' dissenting opinion in the
instant case, "the Legislature may prescribe any method for succession or
devise of homestead subject only to the prohibition that a homestead is not
subject to devise if the owner is survived by spouse or minor child." 39
Accepting the court's reasoning at face value, a revolutionary concept
emerges in probate law: The right to devise is inherent in the ownership
of property.4 0 The court's interpretation of article X, section 4(c) as a prohibition against inconsistent legislative enactments implies that homestead
property may be denied except as expressly forbidden by the constitution.
Since the legislature can no longer restrict homestead devise except as permitted by the constitution, any additional restraints can only be imposed.
by constitutional amendment. Thus, whatever reasoning is used to justify
the holding in the instant case, the result implicitly contradicts the concept
that the right to devise is purely statutory.
The instant case also invites speculation about the validity of section
731.27 of the Florida Statutes. 41 The invalidation of section 731.05 casts

35.

Id.

36. The right to devise or inherit property is not mentioned in the United States
Constitution. The right is purely statutory, and the legislature is restricted only by state
constitutional limitations. See, e.g., In re Olsen's Estate, 181 So. 2d 642 (Fla. 1966); Taylor
v. Payne, 154 Fla. 359, 17 So. 2d 615 (1944), appeal dismissed, 323 U.S. 666 (1944).
37. The right to devise is granted by FLA. STAT. §731.05 (1969).
38. See, e.g., Monington v. Turner, 251 So. 2d 872 (Fla. 1971); State ex rel. Jones v.
Wiseheart, 245 So. 2d 849 (Fla. 1971).
39. 258 So. 2d at 452 (dissenting opinion).
40. Arguably, the constitution might be the source of this new right to devise. However,
not only does this view contradict the concept that the state constitution does not grant
power, but also finds no support in the constitution itself. The consitution nowhere
expressly permits the devise of property, but only expressly prohibits the devise of homestead property in certain situations. Therefore, since the court found that the constitution
prohibited any further legislative restraint on the right of an individual to devise his property, it must have viewed the right to devise as existing independently of the constitution or
statute. See 258 So. 2d at 451.
41. FA. STAT. §731.27 (1969) provides: "The homestead shall descend as other property; provided, however, that if the decedent is survived by a widow and lineal descendants,
the widow shall take a life estate in the homestead, with vested remainder to the lineal
descendants in being at the time of the death of the decedent." (Emphasis added.)
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doubt on the continued viability of section 731.27 because the statutes share
a common origin.42
While section 731.27 prohibits devise of the homestead if the owner is
survived by a widow, the constitution prohibits devise if the owner is survived by a spouse. The constitution thus provides a widower the same protection as a widow. Article X, section 5 provides that married women and
married men are to be treated equally in the disposition of their property. 43
Thus, this provision strongly suggests that section 731.27 creates an unconstitutional distinction between husband and wife44 because it provides
different treatment for descent and distribution of homestead property,
depending upon the sex of the deceased homestead owner. 45
The problem dealt with in the instant case and the concomitant problem
presented by section 731.27 have been anticipated by the legislature, but
remedial action has been delayed. 46 One proposal would amend the constitution to delete all restrictions on the transfer of homestead property, thus
leaving any restrictions entirely to legislative discretion. 47 However, in view
of the instant decisions's implied holding that the right to devise is an inherent right, which should not be restricted except as expressly allowed by
the constitution, this grant of legislative discretion would be invalid. Since
only the law relating to devise of the homestead has been brought within
the intent of the constitution, it still remains for the unequal treatment of
a married man's homestead under section 731.27 to be reconciled with the
constitution. One proposal has been to amend section 731.27 to allow
either surviving spouse an election to take a life estate in the homestead
48
in addition to an intestate share.
Although the instant decision was not sufficiently justified by the court's
opinion, it provided long-needed reform in the area of homestead devise
by effectuating the intent of the new constitutional provision. Homestead
owners are no longer prohibited from devising the homestead if only adult

42. See text accompanying notes 11, 16 supra. See also Fla. Laws 1933, ch. 16103, §§6,
28; Fla. Comp. Gen. Laws §§5477(2), 5480(5) (1936); Fla. Laws 1945, ch. 22783, §1, at
501-02, 507.
43. FLA. CONST. art. X, §5.
44. FLA. CONST. art. X, §5 provides: "There shall be no distinction between married
women and married men in the holding, control, disposition, or encumbering of their
property, both real and personal; except that dower or courtesy may be established and
regulated by law."
45. For example, if the husband owns the property and dies leaving a "widow and
lineal descendants," his widow takes a life estate with vested remainder in the lineal
descendants. FLA. STAT. §731.27 (1969). But if the wife dies as owner of the homestead
the widower is required to take a share of the property as one of the lineal descendants.
FLA. STAT. §731.23 (1969).

46. See FLORIDA LEGISLATURE, HISTORY OF LEGISLATION 109 (Reg. Sess. 1971).
47. Fla. S. J. Res. 554 called for an amendment to the constitution to provide that
alienation of homestead be left to the legislature. Id.

48. FLORIDA LEGISLATURE, supra note 48. Fla. S. 555 called for an amendment to
§§731.05 (1), .27 to conform to the constitution. Id. For the full text of the proposed change
see FLORIDA LAW REVISION COMM'N, ANNUAL REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS 55 (1970-1971).

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol24/iss4/12

6

